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What is the Monetary





hat is the monetary standard? Another way to ask this question is
to ask how central banks control the price level. In this article, I
contrast two views. What I term the “quantity-theory” view im-
plies that to control inﬂation (with the interest rate as its policy instrument)
the central bank needs a policy (reaction function) that relinquishes control
of real variables to the price system and that controls trend inﬂation through
the way it shapes the expectational environment in which price setters oper-
ate. With credibility, a central bank can allow drift in the price level arising
from inﬂation shocks because these shocks do not propagate. What I term the
“nonmonetary” view implies that to control inﬂation the central bank needs a
reaction function whose central element is the manipulation of the difference
between the unemployment rate and a full employment benchmark for unem-
ployment subject to the constraint imposed by the Phillips curve. The Phillips
curve gives the cost in terms of excess unemployment of preventing inﬂation
shocks from propagating into inﬂation.
Section 1 exposits the quantity-theory view while Section 2 makes it rel-
evant to actual central bank procedures. Section 3 presents the nonmonetary
view. Section 4 treats the contrast between the pre- and post-Volcker periods
as an “experiment” in policy procedures useful for choosing between these
two views.
The ideas expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. The author grate-
fully acknowledges helpful criticism from Christopher Herrington, Andreas Hornstein, Thomas
Humphrey, Thomas Lubik, Bennett McCallum, and Alexander Wolman. Author e-mail:
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1. THE QUANTITY-THEORY VIEW OF INFLATION
The nominal-real distinction is at the heart of the quantity theory. It arises
from the “rationality postulate.” Namely, only real variables (physical quan-
tities and relative prices) as opposed to nominal variables (dollar magnitudes)
affect individuals’well-being. Because individuals care only about real vari-
ables, the implication follows that central banks must care about (control) a
nominal variable to control the price level. Central banks possess a monopoly
on the creation of the monetary base (a nominal variable). However, because
they use the interest rate as their policy variable, money (the monetary base)
is determined by market forces. What nominal variable do they control that
allows them to inﬂuence the behavior of price setters, who care about only
real variables (relative prices)? The following explanation proceeds from the
insights incorporated in the Cambridge equation of exchange, to theWicksel-
lian discussion of money supply determination, to the rational expectations
discussion of nominal determinacy with central bank interest rate targeting,






= k(rt) · yt, (1)
with mt the nominal money stock; pt the price level; k(rt) the fraction of its
income the public desires to hold in the form of money, which depends on
the nominal interest rate, rt; and yt real income (Pigou 1917). Equation (1)
receives content from the assumption that the central bank can cause nominal
money, mt, to change independently of the public’s demand for real money
(purchasing power), k(rt) · yt. In these circumstances, the price level will
adjust. As a heuristic illustration of how nominal money can change without
a prior change in real money demand, Milton Friedman ([1969]1969) made
famous the example of a drop of helicopter money.1
This formulation is not generally applicable to historical experience be-
cause central banks have only rarely attempted to control money directly
through targets for monetary aggregates.2 Nevertheless, what is captured
by the quantity-theory appellation is that changes in the price level function
as an equilibrating variable in a way that depends on how the central bank
controls money creation. In the case in which it pegs its exchange rate to
another currency, the price level varies to cause the real terms of trade to
vary to equilibrate the balance of international trade. In the case of ﬂoating
exchange rates, as highlighted in equation (1), the price level (or the goods
1 On Friedman’s contributions to monetary economics, see Hetzel (2007).
2 For references to central bank attempts to use money targets, see Rich (1987), Neumann
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price of money—the inverse of the price level) varies to endow the nominal
money stock with the purchasing power desired by the public. In this sense,
the price level varies to clear the market for the quantity of money. It is this
power to control money creation that provides the central bank with control
overthedomesticpricelevel. Buthowdoesitexercisethispower? Theanswer
is not obvious because nominal money is demand-determined (determined by
the public) given the use of an interest rate by central banks as their policy
instrument.
An answer to this question starts with an understanding of a long tradi-
tion associated with the name of Knut Wicksell.3 It is useful to recapitulate
this literature from its earliest quantity theory roots in the mid-18th century
through its most recent rational expectations formulation in the mid-1980s.
The British economist David Hume introduced the central analytical distinc-
tion of the quantity theory—the nominal/real dichotomy. Both he and Adam
Smith explained how the increase in money caused by the New World gold
discoveries would leave the interest rate on capital unaffected.4 Among oth-
ers, the later British economists Henry Thornton, David Ricardo, James Mill,
Alfred Marshall, andArthur Pigou emphasized that the productivity of capital
determines the real rate of interest relevant to investors (the “natural” rate).
Writing during the suspension of the gold standard at the time of the
Napoleonic Wars, Henry Thornton became the ﬁrst one to understand a cen-
tral bank as a creator of ﬁat (paper) money. Thornton was also the ﬁrst one to
explain changes in the supply of money as a manifestation of the difference
between the bank rate and the natural rate (the real rate of interest determined
by the productivity of capital) (see Hetzel 1987, 9). If the central bank main-
tains a rate of interest different from this natural rate of interest, the nominal
stock of money would change independently of prior changes in real money
demand and the price level would have to adjust. In the 1820s,Thomas Joplin
associated bank deposit creation with the excess of demand for investment
over saving caused by a rate charged on bank loans below the natural rate
earned on capital.
Wicksell offered the most famous statement of how changes in the money
stock arise when the interest rate set by banks or the central bank differs
3 The discussion draws on Humphrey (1974, 1983b, and 1990). See also Humphrey and
Keleher (1982).
4 Hume ([1752]1956) wrote in Political Discourses (cited in Humphrey 1983b, 13): “Money
having chieﬂy a ﬁctitious value, the greater or less plenty of it is of no consequence....[I]f you
lent me so much labour and so many commodities; by receiving ﬁve per cent, you always receive
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from the natural interest rate.5 Wicksell ([1898]1965, 120, 148, and 189) also
prescribed a price level rule for setting the interest rate peg:
[T]here is a certain level of the average rate of interest which is such
that the general level of prices has no tendency to move either upwards
or downwards....Its magnitude is determined by the current level of the
natural capital rate and rises and falls with it. If...the average rate of
interest is set and maintained below this normal level...prices will rise
and go on rising.
[O]nce the entrepreneurs begin to rely upon this process continuing—as
soon, that is to say, as they start reckoning on a future rise in prices—the
actual rise will become more and more rapid. In the extreme case in
which the expected rise in prices is each time fully discounted, the annual
rise in prices will be indeﬁnitely great.
If prices rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the
rate of interest is to be lowered.
Whatpreventsthe“entrepreneurs”citedbyWicksellfromlookingaheadto
the “indeﬁnitely great” rise in prices and initiating an immediate rise in prices
that prevents any leverage of the central bank over the bank-rate/natural-rate
discrepancy? This issue appears in Friedman’s ([1968]1969) restatement of
the implication that an arbitrary interest rate peg by the central bank would
produce an indeﬁnite rise in the price level. By incorporating Irving Fisher’s
(1896) distinction between nominal and real interest rates, Friedman pointed
outthatincreasesinexpectedinﬂationwouldlowertherealinterestratecorre-
sponding to the nominal rate peg and would thereby intensify money creation
and the rise in inﬂation. Sargent and Wallace (1975, 250) derived an expres-
sion that makes the contemporaneous price level a function of the expected
future price level and used it to reformulate the Friedman/Wicksell critique of
howanarbitraryinterestratepegleavesthepricelevelunanchored. “Thepub-
lic therefore expects that, ceteris paribus, any increase in pt [the price level]
will be met by an equal increase in mt [the nominal money stock]....There is
then nothing to anchor the expected price level.” However, McCallum (1981,
1986) pointed out that a central bank that uses the interest rate as its policy in-
strumentcanfollowarulethattiesdownthepublic’sexpectationofanominal
variable (either money or the future price level), thereby rendering the price
level determinate.6
5 Wicksell’s analysis did not incorporate the distinction between the nominal and real interest
rate developed by Fisher (1896). Friedman ([1968]1969) ﬁrst combined this distinction with the
Wicksell analysis. For a discussion of the history of the distinction between real and nominal
interest rates, see Humphrey (1983a).
6 Goodfriend (1987) extended the analysis by showing that the central bank’s rule need only
constrain how the public forms its expectation of the price level in response to shocks. Through
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The McCallum result permits an understanding of actual central bank
procedures for controlling inﬂation by reconciling the endogeneity of money
with price level determinacy. His result rests on the rational expectations
hypothesis that the central bank can condition the inﬂationary expectations of
pricesetters(ﬁrms)throughconsistentbehavior. Buthow,giventherationality
postulate that requires that the central bank control something real if it is to
inﬂuence the behavior of private agents whose welfare depends only on real
variables? Because central bank use of an interest rate instrument renders
money endogenous, its control over prices does not work off a quantitative
targetformoneyandareal-balanceeffect.7 Itfollowsthatthecontrolofprices
mustderivefromthecentralbank’sabilitytocontrolthepublic’sexpectationof
the value of money. Speciﬁcally, the central bank must inﬂuence the behavior
of ﬁrms through its control over this expectation. Its control over inﬂation
must work off the desire of ﬁrms to set a relative price (a real variable) when
they set the dollar price of their product.
One can think of the changes in dollar prices that ﬁrms make as com-
prising two components. The “relative-price-altering” component originates
in a desire to change the relative price of their product. The “relative-price-
preserving” component originates in a desire to prevent changes in the price
level from altering the relative price that ﬁrms desire for their product. This
componentmakesdollarpricesettingdependonforecastsofthefuturebehav-
ior of the price level.8 Because of these changes in the price level, ﬁrms face a
coordination problem. Namely, how do they change their dollar price in tan-
dem with the change in the average dollar prices of other ﬁrms? The rational
expectations hypothesis is that, with respect to the relative-price-preserving
componentofchangesindollarprices, ﬁrmswillcoordinateonthesystematic
part of monetary policy. But why should they look to the central bank rather
than to some extraneous variable (“sunspots”) in solving this coordination
problem? As explained below, the central bank has the ability to “shock” real
expected price level) and must care about expected changes in the future price level. A central
bank concerned about the “inﬂationary psychology” of bond markets will naturally possess such
concerns. The introduction of a third concern beyond the smoothing of actual and expected changes
in the price level, namely, a desire to smooth the interest rate, introduces drift in the price level
(relative to trend).
One can understand the Goodfriend/McCallum analysis as an application in the monetary area
of the general argument for rules made in Lucas ([1980]1981, 255): “[O]ur ability as economists
to predict the responses of agents rests, in situations where expectations about the future matter,
on our understanding of the stochastic environment agents believe themselves to be operating in.
In practice, this limits the class of policies the consequences of which we can hope to assess in
advance to policies generated by ﬁxed, well understood, relatively permanent rules (or functions
relating policy actions taken to the state of the economy).”
7 With nominal money ﬁxed, an increase in the price level reduces real money and real
spending through the real-balance effect (Patinkin 1965).
8 In a world of expected price stability, ﬁrms only change dollar prices to change relative
prices. The enhanced ability of the dollar to serve as a numeraire (a measure of relative prices)
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economic activity through unanticipated money creation (destruction) if the
public’s inﬂationary expectations differ from its objective for trend inﬂation.
To understand this ability, consider the case where the price level evolves
unpredictably.9 Assume, for illustrative purposes, that each period the central
bank chooses a random, unannounced target for the price level. In particular,
assumethatwithoutannouncementthecentralbanksetsthisperiod’stargetfor
thepricelevelbelowlastperiod’starget. Althoughindividualﬁrmswillnotice
a fall in the demand for their product, that information does not reveal the new
price level target.10 Imagine now aWalrasian “nominal” auctioneer who calls
out price levels successively lower than last period’s target. Individual ﬁrms
coordinate reductions in their dollar prices using the auctioneer’s announced
price level to preserve their relative prices. The process ends when ﬁrms
resume selling an amount consistent with their proﬁt-maximizing markup.11
If the central bank behaves in a way that renders the evolution of the price
level predictable, the resulting common expectation of the future price level
serves the function of the auctioneer.
Therationalexpectationslogicthatpricesettersformtheirexpectationsin
a way that conforms to the systematic part of monetary policy is that any pre-
dictable sequence of price level targets leaves real variables unaffected (apart
from possible changes in real money demand). In contrast, if monetary policy
causes the price level to evolve in an unpredictable way, it becomes harder for
theindividualﬁrmtopredicthowotherﬁrmswillchangetheirdollarprices. In
thecaseofunanticipateddeﬂation, theﬁrstﬁrmtoloweritspricesellsataloss
by selling too much. The price stickiness that accompanies an unpredictable
monetary policy shock results from the cost to ﬁrms of changing their dollar
prices as part of an uncoordinated tˆ atonnement process to discover the price
level consistent with potential output. Because there is a social externality
to lowering an individual dollar price to achieve the required reduction in the
price level that the individual ﬁrm does not capture, individual ﬁrms are slow
9An historical analogue is the real bills period when the Fed tried to restrain what it con-
sidered speculation in commodity and stock markets or the stop-go period when it shifted between
attempting to target the unemployment rate and inﬂation (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 3, 23, 24, and 25).
For other countries, central bank attempts of uncertain duration to inﬂuence the foreign exchange
value of their currencies are an example.
10 The money stock will fall, but variation in the demand for money obscures the implications
of nominal money for the price level target.
11 The auctioneer is omniscient in that he knows that the reduction in aggregate demand is
a nominal phenomenon, not a real one due, say, to a perceived reduction in productivity growth
that makes the public feel poorer. He also knows when ﬁrms’ markups (price over marginal cost)
return to their proﬁt-maximizing levels. At that time, he ceases to call out reductions in the price
level.
The markup is a real variable. Although monetary contraction leads initially to its expansion
(assuming no labor hoarding), ultimately ﬁrms collectively change their dollar prices to leave the
markup at its proﬁt-maximizing (natural) value. See Goodfriend (2004) and Goodfriend and King
(1997).R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Standard 153
to lower their dollar prices in response to an unanticipated fall in aggregate
nominal demand.12
One can now answer the question of how the central bank controls the
behaviorofﬁrmstoachieveadesiredtrendrateofinﬂation. Theself-interestof
ﬁrmsingettingtheirrelativepricesrightcausesthemcollectivelytocoordinate
on the predictable behavior of the price level in setting price-preserving dollar
prices. Of course, that common coordination presupposes the credibility of
monetary policy. If the expectation of inﬂation in the marketplace diverges
from the central bank’s inﬂation target, the central bank must create (destroy)
moneyinawaythatshockstherealeconomy.13 Thereisa“stickinthecloset,”
but with credibility, the central bank need never take it out.
2. MONETARY CONTROL WITHAN INTEREST RATE
INSTRUMENT
The quantity-theory framework reviewed above guides the search for empir-
ical generalizations summarizing central bank behavior that are capable of
explaining when the central bank is successful in controlling inﬂation.14 This
framework implies the necessity for disciplining the central bank reaction
function in two ways. First, the central bank must possess procedures that
allow it to set the short-term interest rate in a way that tracks the natural rate
ofinterest(i.e., allowsthepricesystemtowork). Theincessantanalysisofthe
real economy engaged in by central banks implies procedures more compli-
cated than the rule advocated by Wicksell of responding directly to the price
12As a result, the ability of money to serve as a numeraire diminishes. The coordination
necessary to allocate resources among specialized markets requires that the price system convey
information about the relative scarcity of resources. The requisite economy of communication
depends on the use of money as a numeraire. That is, changes in dollar prices should convey
information about changes in the relative scarcity of resources. Unpredictable evolution of the price
level lessens the ability of money to serve this function. The price system lacks a mechanism
for distinguishing between changes in dollar prices required by changes in the scarcity of money
and changes in dollar prices required by changes in the relative scarcity of goods. Because there
is no way of coordinating the former changes when the price level evolves unpredictably, the
dollar prices set by individual ﬁrms no longer provide reliable information about the desirability
of expanding or contracting output. There is a conﬂict between the role of the price level as a
numeraire and its role as an equilibrating variable that endows nominal money with the purchasing
power desired by the public.
13 The Lucas (1972) Phillips curve, in which the output gap depends on the difference be-
tween actual and expected inﬂation, captures this idea. However, instead of actual inﬂation the
appropriate measure is inﬂation consistent with the behavior of the central bank. In response to
an unanticipated monetary shock that initially impacts output but not inﬂation, actual and expected
inﬂation may remain identical although expected inﬂation differs from policy-consistent inﬂation.
14 I attribute the success of monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan era to its underlying
consistency and to the way that consistency shaped inﬂationary expectations. However, the relent-
less exercise by the FOMC of reading how the real economy responds to shocks obscures the
rule-like behavior of the central bank imposed by the discipline of maintaining low, constant-trend
inﬂation. In contrast to this view, Blinder and Reis (2005) attribute the success of monetary policy
in the Greenspan era to the exercise of ongoing discretion. For a more complete discussion, see
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level. Second, there must be something systematic in central bank procedures
that ties down the way that the public forms its expectation of the future price
level (i.e., provides a nominal anchor).
I characterize the underlying consistency in the procedures that restored
near price stability in the Volcker-Greenspan era as lean-against-the-wind
(LAW) with credibility (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 13–21). Speciﬁcally, the FOMC
raised the funds rate in a measured, persistent way in response to sustained
increases in the rate of resource utilization (declines in the unemployment
rate) subject to the constraint that bond markets believed that such changes
would cumulate to whatever extent necessary to maintain trend inﬂation at
a low, unchanged rate. In the event of an inﬂation scare (a sharp jump in
the long-term bond rate), the FOMC raised the funds rate more aggressively
(Goodfriend 1993; Hetzel 2008, chaps. 13 and 14). Conversely, the FOMC
lowered the funds rate in a measured, persistent way in response to sustained
declines in the rate of resource utilization subject to the constraint that bond
marketsbelievedthatsuchchangeswouldnotcumulatetoanextentthatwould
raise trend inﬂation.
The “persistent” part of the “measured, persistent” changes in the funds
ratemadeinresponsetosustainedchangesinthedegreeofresourceutilization
captures the search for the (unobserved) natural rate.15 What is important is
that the FOMC does not derive its funds rate target analytically from a real
intermediate target like excess unemployment but rather follows a procedure
thatturnsdeterminationofthe(realandnominal)fundsrateovertotheworking
of the economy. Although the FOMC exercises transitory control over the
short-term real rate of interest, it does not control the real interest rate in a
sustained way.16 By extension, neither does it determine other real variables
such as the unemployment rate (Hetzel 2005, 2006).
Implementation of these procedures required judgment. Much of the
FOMC’s wide-ranging review of economic activity involved assessment of
whetheraggregate-demandshocks(changesinresourceutilizationrates)were
sustained or transitory, with only the former calling for funds rate changes.
With respect to the “measured” characterization, on rare occasions, incoming
data on the economy changed rapidly from offering mixed signals to offer-
ing a strong, consistent signal on the change in resource utilization. On these
15 The natural rate can be thought of as the real interest rate consistent with complete price
ﬂexibility (the absence of monetary nonneutrality). Alternatively, one can think of the natural rate
as consistent with the operation of the real business cycle core of the economy (Goodfriend 2007).
16 This assumption lies in the Wicksellian tradition, referred to in Section 1, which assumes
that the natural rate of interest is determined by real factors. For example, Pigou (1927, 251)
argued for the determination of the real interest rate by real factors, speciﬁcally “by the general
conditions of demand and supply of real capital....[T]he Central Bank, despite its apparent au-
tonomy, is in fact merely a medium through which forces wholly external to it work their will.
Though...in determining the discount rate, the voice is the voice of the bank, the hands are not
its hands” (cited in Humphrey 1983b, 19).R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Standard 155
occasions, forexampleatthestartoftherecessionsinyear-end1990andearly
2001, the FOMC moved the funds rate by a larger amount than the typical
one-quarter percentage point.17 What is important is not the period-by-period
timing of funds rate changes but rather the overall discipline imposed by the
requirementofnominalexpectationalstability. Attimesofincreasingresource
utilization, ﬁnancial markets must believe that funds rate increases will cu-
mulate to whatever extent necessary to maintain trend inﬂation unchanged at
a low level. At times of decreasing resource utilization, markets must believe
that funds rate decreases will be reversed when necessary to maintain trend
inﬂation unchanged.
These LAW-with-credibility procedures condition the behavior of ﬁnan-
cial markets. In response to real aggregate-demand shocks, markets predict
thefuturepathofthefundsratenecessarytoreturnoutputtopotential,butthey
do not have to forecast the impact on output of an expansionary or contrac-
tionary monetary policy that would force changes in inﬂation. The resulting
continuousvariationintheyieldcurveinresponsetoincominginformationon
the economy, in which all the variation in future forward rates is real, reduced
ﬂuctuations in real output around trend and produced the period of inﬂation
and output stability known as the Great Moderation.18 The economic fore-
casts that determine the shape of the yield curve are subject to error, but the
process is continually self-correcting. Persistently signed innovations in in-
coming economic data cause cumulative movements in the yield curve. Note
that policymakers and markets “converse” with each other. Central banks do
not make public an expected path for the funds rate, but they freely share
information about their own forecasts of the economy. Markets then set the
yield curve.
The real world counterpart of the quantity-theory thought experiment of
an exogenous change in money occurs when markets misforecast the nature
and magnitude of a shock for a signiﬁcant period of time. Consider underesti-
mationbythemarketsofthemagnitudeandpersistenceofapositiverealshock
so that initially the yield curve fails to rise to the extent required to return real
output to trend. Money increases beyond the amount necessary to keep inﬂa-
tion unchanged and portfolio rebalancing occurs (Goodfriend 2000).19 That
17 Such information implies that the contemporaneous level of the real funds rate differs
signiﬁcantly from its natural value.
18 For a discussion of the issue of whether the Great Moderation resulted from better mon-
etary policy or fewer macroeconomic shocks, see Velde (2004).
19 For example, in the last part of the 1980s, the yen appreciated strongly. Under the assump-
tion that this appreciation would dampen export growth and inﬂation, the Bank of Japan (Finance
Ministry) did not raise the discount rate. Given the credibility of monetary policy for price sta-
bility, money (M2) growth rose initially without inﬂation. Portfolio rebalancing appeared in the
form of a rise in equity prices and output growth rose strongly (Hetzel 1999). Another example
occurred in fall 1998 and spring 1999. At the time, markets widely expected that the Asia crisis
would spread and would create worldwide recession and even deﬂation. In response, the yield156 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is, money creation causes portfolio holders to rearrange their asset portfolios
by buying fewer liquid assets such as bonds and stocks. The prices of these
assets rise and their yield falls. In response to the increase in money, the price
levelrisesbutwithoutanincreaseintrendinﬂationaslongasmonetarypolicy
remains credible. Especially because of the difﬁculty of determining the per-
sistence of a shock, it is inevitable that episodes will occur when real shocks
push output away from trend and affect the price level. Nevertheless, what
is remarkable is how well monetary policy has worked over the last quarter
century.
The quantity-theory framework outlined in Section 1 and the above char-




rate (the rate consistent with perfectly ﬂexible prices). Under this assump-
tion, the central bank merely accommodates changes in the demand for real
money associated with whatever real forces drive growth in the real economy
plus random changes in real money demand.20 These are “price-preserving”
changes in money.
To illustrate “price-altering” changes in money, consider the example in
which the central bank raises its interest rate peg with a lag in response to a
permanent real shock to productivity growth that increases the value of the
natural rate (Hetzel 2005). The counterpart of the resulting bank rate/natural
rate discrepancy is a demand for a ﬂow of services from the capital stock and
a ﬂow of consumption that exceeds the amounts given by a hypothetical real
economy with completely ﬂexible prices. The price paid for the utilization of
resources today is set too low in terms of resources foregone tomorrow. Cor-
responding to this excess demand for resources is a ﬂow of credit demanded
of banks by the public. With a funds rate left unchanged by the central bank,
banks accommodate this additional demand through an increase in their de-
posits. Maintenance by the central bank of the real interest rate below the
natural rate is a form of price ﬁxing that creates an excess supply of money
(demand for credit) as the counterpart to goods shortages. The concomitant
monetary emissions force portfolio rebalancing and changes in the price level
curve fell. In the event, the U.S. stock market rose strongly in 1999 and domestic consumption
surged (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 17 and 18).
A transitory rise in output (consumption) relative to expected future output (consumption)
restrains the rise in the real interest rate (Hetzel 2005).
20 Money holders who desire additional real money balances sell debt instruments such as
Treasury bills to banks and receive demand deposits in return. The central bank accommodates
any increase in required reserves as a consequence of maintaining its interest rate peg. Changes
in nominal money demand match changes in real money demand so that the price level need not
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(Hetzel 2004). These are “price-altering” changes in money because they
occur with no prior increase in real money demand.
Apolicyprocedurethatdisciplinesmoneycreationtoallowonlyforprice-
preserving changes in money imposes two sorts of disciplines (real and nom-
inal) that correspond to the two characteristics of the LAW-with-credibility
characterization of theVolcker-Greenspan procedures. The ﬁrst (the real) dis-
cipline entails the LAW characteristic whereby the real funds rate tracks the
natural interest rate. As long as the central bank maintains the real interest
rate equal to the natural rate, real money grows in line with the real money
demand consistent with the hypothetical operation of the economy with com-
plete price ﬂexibility and with real money demand shocks.21 The second
(the nominal) discipline entails credibility for maintenance of an unchanged
trend inﬂation rate despite recurrent real aggregate-demand shocks and inﬂa-
tion shocks. Credibility means ﬁrms coordinate the relative-price-preserving
changes in their dollar prices on the central bank’s inﬂation target. Expected
inﬂation then equals the central bank’s inﬂation target. This level of expected
inﬂation drives an equal amount of money growth and inﬂation.
The ﬁnal component of money demand that adds to money growth arises
from an inﬂation target as opposed to a price level target. This component ac-
commodatestransitoryinﬂationshocks(relativepriceshocksthatpassthrough
to the price level) and thus allows the price level and money to wander but
without affecting trend inﬂation.22 The central bank can accommodate inﬂa-
tion shocks as long as it is credible. Speciﬁcally, the central bank can target
core inﬂation (inﬂation stripped of volatile series like food and energy) while
assuming that expected trend inﬂation remains unchanged. That is, the public
does not extrapolate variability in observed inﬂation into the future. Subject
to credibility, the central bank’s reaction function causes nominal money de-
mand to grow at a rate that does not require the inﬂation rate to differ from its
target. All changes in money are price-preserving.
3. THE NONMONETARY VIEW OF INFLATION
Theterm“quantitytheory”focusesonthekindofanalyticalframeworkuseful
for understanding the behavior of the price level by directing attention toward
the way in which the central bank controls money creation. Trivially, as made
21 The behavior of the economy is determined by its real business cycle core.
22 Depending on the time-series properties of inﬂation shocks, inﬂation exhibits both persis-
tence and variability around trend. It is important not to confuse that observed persistence (positive
autocorrelation) in inﬂation with intrinsic (hard-wired) inﬂation. It does not follow that the central
bank is reducing the variability of output by increasing the variability of inﬂation. At the same
time, if the central bank attempted to eliminate transitory ﬂuctuations in inﬂation around trend, it
would increase the variability of output. Credibility allows it to control inﬂation without adding
variability to output beyond what is built into the response of the real business cycle core of the
economy to shocks.158 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
evident by the discussion of the equation of exchange (1), real factors affect
the price level. In contrast to the quantity-theory view, nonmonetary views
make these real factors into the central actors determining the price level. In
the form of an inﬂation shock, they raise the price level. A built-in rigidity in
prices allows the central bank to reduce growth in real expenditure by lower-
ing growth in nominal expenditure. As a result, it raises the unemployment
rate. The central bank controls inﬂation by playing off one real factor (an
increase in the unemployment rate) against another real factor (an inﬂation
shock). According to this view, the central bank faces a menu of choices
whereby it can reduce the variability of inﬂation by increasing the variability
of unemployment, and conversely.
Here,Ireviewthenonmonetaryviewthatisassociatedwiththetraditional
Keynesian Phillips curve (2). This variant shaped the policymaking environ-
ment in the stop-go period, which lasted from 1965 until 1979. The inﬂation
rate is πt. The output gap, xt, is the difference between the log of actual out-
put, yt, andpotentialoutput, y
p
t ,o r(yt −y
p
t ). Togivetheoutputgapempirical
content, practitioners of this view often use as a proxy the cyclical behavior
of output measured by the difference between actual output and a trend line
ﬁtted to output. The εt is an inﬂation or cost-push shock.
πt = πt−1 + αxt−1 + εt α>0 (2)
From the perspective of the nonmonetary view, explanations of inﬂation
are eclectic in the sense that each episode of inﬂation can possess its own
primary cause. In the stop-go period, discussions of inﬂation typically began
with a taxonomic classiﬁcation of the different generic causes of inﬂation.
The major classiﬁcations in this taxonomy were aggregate demand (demand-
pull) and aggregate supply (cost-push), with propagation of these sources of
inﬂation through intrinsic inﬂation persistence (a wage-price spiral).23
Demand-pull inﬂation arises from a positive output gap (xt > 0) . A
variety of inﬂuences can boost real aggregate demand. At least through the
early 1970s, the consensus among economists was that deﬁcit spending (the
full-employment surplus or deﬁcit) exercised a strong inﬂuence on real ag-
gregate demand while monetary policy actions, which worked through the
interest rate, exercised only a negligible impact. Cost-push inﬂation arises
from positive inﬂation shocks (εt > 0), that is, from factors that affect supply
anddemandinparticularmarkets. Economistshaveidentiﬁedinﬂationshocks
with a large number of factors such as food and energy prices, depreciation
of the foreign exchange value of the currency, monopoly power of unions
and corporations, and government regulations. As reﬂected in the value of 1
on the coefﬁcient on the πt−1 term, intrinsic inﬂation persistence propagates
23 References are legion in the pre-1980 literature. See, for example, Ackley 1961 and
Bronfenbrenner and Holzman 1963. See also Hetzel (2008, chaps. 1, 6, 11, 22, and 26).R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Standard 159
these shocks unless the central bank offsets them by creating a negative out-
put gap.24 In the 1970s, economists often attributed inﬂation to a wage-price
spiral set off by the aggregate-demand shock of Vietnam War spending and
later the supply shocks of OPEC oil price increases (Nelson 2005 and Hetzel
2008, chaps. 6, 11, and 22).
The nonmonetary view has evolved over time. The dominant pre-1970s
view did not associate the central bank with inﬂation. That changed after the
association of inﬂation and high rates of money growth in the 1970s (Hetzel
2008, chap. 1). The prevailing view then changed to acceptance of the view
that central banks can control inﬂation. However, the assumption was that to
avoid a socially unacceptable high unemployment rate the central bank had to
accommodate through high money growth the inﬂation caused by cost-push
shocks. The genesis of inﬂation lies in excessive growth of real aggregate
demand or in inﬂation shocks with hard-wired (intrinsic) propagation of the
resulting inﬂation into future inﬂation, unless the central bank offsets it by
raising unemployment. The central bank then faces a tradeoff. It can reduce
inﬂation but only by increasing unemployment. More generally, the central
bankcanreducethevariabilityofinﬂationbutonlybyincreasingthevariability
of unemployment.
4. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
KnowledgeofwhatmonetarypoliciestheFedfollowedinthepastandofhow
they changed over time aids in the choice between the quantity theory and
the nonmonetary view as the better description of how central banks control
inﬂation. Thereasonisthateachofthesetwoviewspossessesdifferentcriteria
for the success of monetary policies. According to the quantity-theory view, a
monetarypolicywillworkwellonlyifitprovidesanominalanchorandallows
the price system to determine real variables. From the nonmonetary view, a
successful monetary policy requires that policymakers choose an appropriate
tradeoff between output (unemployment) variability and inﬂation variability,
giventheinﬂationshockstheyconfront. Also,policymakersneedtoachievean
optimal policy mix. Speciﬁcally, they should choose the optimal mix among
monetary, ﬁscal, and incomes policies given their assessment of the nature of
inﬂation as demand-pull, cost-push, or wage-spiral.25
Monetary policies have evolved with changes in the intellectual and
politicalenvironmentandalsowiththeintellectualtemperofFOMCchairmen
24 In terms of the Phillips curve (2), the central bank would need to raise the real interest
rate to reduce aggregate real demand, thereby creating a negative output gap (xt < 0). A negative
output gap would offset the positive effect of an inﬂation shock (εt > 0) on inﬂation (πt).
25 “Incomes policies” is the general term for government intervention in the price and wage
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(Hetzel 2008, chap. 2). Modern central banking began with the Treasury-
Fed Accord of March 1951. In the changed intellectual environment of the
post-war period, monetary policymakers replaced their assumed responsibil-
ity under the real bills doctrine to prevent what in their judgment constituted
unsustainable increases in asset prices (due to speculation in stock and com-
modity markets) with responsibility for economic stabilization (Hetzel 2008,
chaps. 3, 4, and 5). After the Accord, FOMC chairman William McChesney
Martin created a monetary policy that adumbrated that of the Volcker-
Greenspan era.26
Two major events shaped the monetary policy invented by Martin (and
his advisorWinﬁeld Rieﬂer). First, with the 1953–1954 recession, the FOMC
began to move the funds rate in a measured, persistent way in response to
changes in the economy’s rate of resource utilization. Second, when price
stability ceded to inﬂation in the period from mid-1956 through 1958 and
with the inﬂation scare of the summer of 1958, Martin began to move short-
term interest rates promptly after cyclical turning points. In the spirit of
real bills, his purpose was to prevent “speculation” in the ﬁnancial markets.
However, Martin made a momentous change. He directed monetary policy
toward preventing the emergence of an inﬂation premium in bond markets
rather than attempting to prevent what in policymakers’ eyes constituted an
unsustainable increase in asset prices (Hetzel 2008, chap. 5).27 The Martin
FOMC’s reaction function, termed here LAW with credibility, foreshadowed
that of Volcker-Greenspan (Hetzel 2008, chap. 21).
After the mid-1960s, monetary policy changed with the advent of stop-
go.28 With stop-go, the FOMC attempted to control the growth rate of real
aggregatedemandinawaythatbalancedtheobjectivesoffullemploymentand
inﬂation. The appellation, stop-go, came from the practice of pursuing stimu-
lative monetary policy during economic recoveries and restrictive policy later
26 See Hetzel and Leach 2001a and 2001b; see also the link, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Treasury-Fed Accord” on http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic research. The eco-
nomics profession understood monetary policy in the context of aggregate-demand management with
inﬂation arising as a consequence of the extent to which the level of aggregate demand stressed
resource utilization. Not until the early 1970s did the economics profession assign a signiﬁcant
role to monetary policy as a determinant of aggregate real demand and, thus, as a useful tool
for aggregate-demand management. In contrast, Martin understood the control of inﬂation in terms
of the control of credit where the inﬂationary expectations of ﬁnancial markets were a gauge of
whether the extension of credit was excessive (Hetzel 2005, chap. 5).
27 During the summer of 1958 and as seen later in 1983 and 1984, the FOMC looked for
sharp, discrete increases in the bond rate as a proxy for an increase in expected inﬂation.
28 Stop-go began in the Johnson administration. After the passage of the Kennedy tax cut
in February 1964, both Congress and the administration united in their opposition to interest rate
increases on the grounds that the increases would thwart the expansionary impact of the tax cuts.
When inﬂation rose starting in 1965 and with his own house divided because of the appointment
of governors by Democratic presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Martin opted for the use of monetary
policy as a bargaining chip. If Congress would pass a tax surcharge, Martin would limit interest
rate increases. Fiscal restraint, Martin hoped, would obviate the need for rate increases (Bremner
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on as inﬂation rose. How did stop-go alter the LAW-with-credibility proce-
duresdevelopedbytheMartinFOMC(priortothepopulistpoliticalpressures
that arose during the Johnson administration)? The attempt during business
cycle recoveries to lower unemployment (reduce the magnitude of the nega-
tive output gap) caused the FOMC to put inertia into short-term interest rates
relative to cyclical movements in real output. The FOMC raised interest rates
only belatedly after cyclical troughs when the unemployment rate was still
high. Similarly, it lowered interest rates only slowly after cyclical peaks. As a
result, money growth became pro-cyclical—rising and high during economic
recovery and falling and low during recessions. With a lag, inﬂation followed
these changes in money growth (Hetzel, chaps. 23–25). In go phases, the pre-
sumption was that a negative output gap (high unemployment) would allow
monetarypolicytobestimulativewithoutraisinginﬂation. Instopphases, the
presumption was that a moderate negative output gap would allow a reduction
ininﬂationatasociallyacceptablecostintermsofunemployment—thepolicy
of gradualism (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 7 and 8).
Stop-goarosefromaconjunctionofapoliticalenvironmentthatdemanded
uninterrupted high real growth and low unemployment with an intellectual
environmentpromisingthatgovernmentaggregate-demandpoliciescouldde-
liver these objectives. The Keynesian consensus held that the optimal com-
bination of ﬁscal and monetary policy could deliver sustained real growth
and high output while incomes policies could limit the resulting inﬂation
(SamuelsonandSolow[1960]1966). Asmanifestedinbeliefsaboutmonetary
policy, thatconsensusrestedontwokeypremises. First, thepricesystemdoes
not work well to maintain full employment. From 1958 through 1965, excess
unemployment (a negative output gap) apparently appeared in the form of an
unemploymentratewellabovetheassumedfull-employmentrateof4percent.
Second, the price level is a nonmonetary phenomenon with inﬂation engen-
dered at various times by either excess aggregate demand (demand-pull) or
supplyshocks(cost-push)andpropagatedbyinﬂationaryexpectationsunteth-
ered by monetary policy (a wage-price spiral).
This hard-wired (intrinsic) propagation of inﬂation supposedly imparted
inertia to inﬂation relative to changes in aggregate nominal demand. Inertia
in actual and expected inﬂation allows the central bank to exercise discre-
tionarycontroloverrealvariables(suchasunemployment)throughitscontrol
of aggregate nominal demand (expenditure). However, the downside of this
inﬂation inertia is that the central bank has to create a signiﬁcant amount of
excess unemployment to offset the effects of inﬂation shocks and to maintain
low, stable inﬂation. Because of this assumption, policymakers generally did
not believe that monetary restriction was the socially optimal way of control-
ling inﬂation. Given the consensus that the inﬂation of the 1970s resulted
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of the Ford administration, all the presidential administrations from Kennedy
through Carter used some form of incomes policies to control inﬂation.
Note the importance of the interaction between the above two premises
abouttheinefﬁcacityofthepricesystemandthenonmonetarycharacterofthe
pricelevel. Inaseriesofarticles, Orphanides(forexample, Orphanides2002)
documented the widespread belief during the 1970s that the unemployment
rate exceeded its full-employment level (or the NAIRU, the non-accelerating
inﬂation rate of unemployment). Using a Taylor rule framework, Orphanides
(2003) attributed the inﬂation of the 1970s to this misestimation of the output
gap. But why did policymakers not promptly revise their estimate of full
employment with the ﬁrst appearance of inﬂation? The reason is that they
attributedinﬂationtocost-pushfactors. Theassumedabilitytoparsetheorigin
of inﬂation and decide whether an aggregate-demand policy or an incomes
policyconstitutedtheappropriateresponsewasafarmorefundamentalfailure
than the technical issue of estimating the NAIRU correctly.
In the stop-go period, policymakers understood monetary policy as re-
quiring the exercise of ongoing discretion about the socially acceptable level
of unemployment to allow and, as a consequence, what amount of inﬂation
to tolerate (Burns 1979; Hetzel 1998 and 2008, chap. 8). The presumed
necessityofraisingtheunemploymentratetoreduceaninﬂationrateassumed
driven by cost-push shocks and propagated by a wage-price spiral appeared to
demanddiscretiontomanageadversepoliticalreaction(Burns1979). Whilea
hard-wired inertia in inﬂation and inﬂationary expectations appeared to allow
for this discretionary control of real variables, such inertia made the excess-
unemployment cost of controlling inﬂation appear very high. Discretion,
however, meant that nothing in central bank procedures imposed constancy of
a nominal variable (such as stable long-run money growth) as a way of disci-
plining period-by-period funds rate changes to assure the time-consistency of
policy (Hetzel 2008, chap. 1).29
The experiment with the discretionary juggling of unemployment and in-
ﬂation targets caused expectations to change in a way that eventually vitiated
the ability of the central bank to control real variables such as unemployment.
The United States had entered into the period of stop-go policy from an en-
vironment of expected price stability created by the long experience with a
commodity standard and, after the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord, a monetary
policy focused on price stability (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 4–7). For this rea-
son, initially, the expansionary policy followed in the go phases of stop-go
exerted a positive inﬂuence on real output. However, over business cycles,
the FOMC allowed the inﬂation rate to drift upward (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 7,
29As the 1970s progressed, some regional Reserve Banks (San Francisco, Richmond,
Philadelphia, and Minneapolis) joined St. Louis in arguing that the control of inﬂation required
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8, 11, and 23–25). In 1966, when stimulative monetary policy began to raise
inﬂation, the contemporaneous expectation that inﬂation was stationary (ﬂuc-
tuatedaroundanunchangedbase)allowedbothinﬂationtoincreasewithoutan
increase in expected inﬂation and output to rise above trend. After 1967, this
assumption of stationarity began to diminish until in 1979, it disappeared.30
In 1979, the public began to associate inﬂation with the Fed rather than with
the market power of large corporations and unions and with special factors
affecting markets for energy, food, medical services, and so on (Hetzel 2008,
chap. 12).31 By 1979, inﬂationary expectations had neutralized the ability of
monetary policy to stimulate the economy (Hetzel 2008, chaps. 1, 7, 8, 11,
13, 14, and 26).32 Stop-go created the expectational environment described in
Kydland-Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1983) in which the anticipatory
behavior of price setters neutralizes the ability of monetary policy to control
real output systematically.
To understand the completeness of the breakdown of the ability of policy-
makers to exploit Phillips curve tradeoffs, it is useful to recall statements
by past policymakers. In perhaps the most famous statement summarizing
the failure of aggregate-demand policies to control unemployment, James
Callaghan, BritishPrimeMinister, summarizedtheBritishexperiencein1976
(cited in Nelson 2001, 27 and Wood 2005, 387):
The cozy world we were told would go on forever, where full employment
would be guaranteed by a stroke of the chancellor’s pen, cutting taxes,
deﬁcit spending...isgone....W eused to think that you could spend your
way out of a recession....I tell you in all candour that that option no
longer exists, and in so far as it ever did exist, it worked on each occasion
since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inﬂation into the economy,
followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.
30 When inﬂation rose in 1966, initially monetary policy turned restrictive. However, unlike
1957 and 1958 when the Fed stayed with restriction until it had eliminated inﬂation, in 1967 it
backed off (see fn. 28 and Hetzel 2008, chap. 7).
31 The reason this recognition occurred only slowly was that the public faced the same sorts
of problems faced by econometricians making inferences with a small number of observations.
There were three sustained surges in inﬂation. The ﬁrst followed the Vietnam War and inﬂation
had always risen in war time. The second surge, which began in early 1973, could be explained
by special factors dependent on supply shortages in oil, food, etc. The fact that trend inﬂation
remained at about 6 percent after the second surge could be explained by an intrinsic inﬂationary
momentum (the wage-price spiral). Only with the third surge that began in 1978 did any signif-
icant part of the economics profession or the public become receptive to Friedman’s monetarist
explanation for inﬂation that highlighted high rates of money creation.
32 Lucas (1996, 679) wrote: “The main ﬁnding that emerged from the research in the 1970s
is that...anticipated monetary expansions...are not associated with...stimulus to employment and
production....Unanticipated monetary expansions on the other hand can stimulate production as,
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Volcker (12/3/80, 4) observed:
[T]he idea of a sustainable “trade off” between inﬂation and prosper-
ity...broke down as businessmen and individuals learned to anticipate
inﬂation, and to act in this anticipation....The result is that orthodox
monetary or ﬁscal measures designed to stimulate could potentially be
thwarted by the self-protective instincts of ﬁnancial and other markets.
Quite speciﬁcally, when ﬁnancial markets jump to anticipate inﬂationary
consequences, and workers and businesses act on the same assumption,
there is room for grave doubt that the traditional measures of purely
demand stimulus can succeed in their avowed purpose of enhancing real
growth.
Greenspan (U.S. Cong. 2/19/93, 55–6) later made the same point:
The effects of policy on the economy depend critically on how market
participants react to actions taken by the Federal Reserve, as well as
on expectations of our future actions....[T]he huge losses suffered by
bondholders during the 1970s and early 1980s sensitized them to the
slightest sign...of rising inﬂation....An overly expansionary monetary
policy, or even its anticipation, is embedded fairly soon in higher in-
ﬂationary expectations and nominal bond yields. Producers incorporate
expected cost increases quickly into their own prices, and eventually any
increase in output disappears as inﬂation rises.
The Volcker (12/3/80, 4) quotation above expresses the situation that he
inherited upon becoming FOMC chairman in August 1979 (see also Good-
friend and King 2005; Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche 2005; and Hetzel
2008, chaps. 1, 13, and 26). Expected inﬂation had become positively related
both to actual inﬂation and to above-trend real growth. Expected inﬂation
passed through quickly to actual inﬂation. By 1979, the Fed was left with
very little ability to produce a wedge between actual and expected inﬂation
and, as a result, with very little ability to manipulate excess unemployment or
an output gap.
Upon becoming FOMC chairman in August 1979, Volcker turned to
moneytargetsasadeviceforachievingcredibility. Especially,Volckerhoped,
the commitment to maintaining moderate money growth would convince the
public that the FOMC would break the prior pattern of allowing inﬂation to
rise during cyclical recoveries. However, the interest sensitivity of the de-
mand for M1 (the monetary aggregate targeted by the FOMC) produced by
the 1980 deregulation of deposit interest rates caused M1 velocity to become
pro-cyclical (Hetzel and Mehra 1989). As a result, steady M1 growth would
exacerbate cyclical ﬂuctuations.
For this reason, in 1983 the FOMC moved to the LAW-with-credibility
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behavior of the inﬂation premium in bond rates, the FOMC attempted to
conduct policy in a way that produced low expected inﬂation consistent with
low actual inﬂation. It also attempted to produce stable expected inﬂation in
place of an expected inﬂation rate that rose in response to cyclically high real
growth or inﬂation shocks. The effort by the Volcker-Greenspan FOMCs to
reestablish the nominal expectational stability lost during the prior stop-go
period ﬁnally succeeded in 1996. With the sharp increases in the funds rate
in 1994 and early 1995, the Fed at last succeeded in allaying the fears of the
bond market vigilantes, who had pushed up bond rates in response to above-
trend real growth and inﬂation shocks (Hetzel 2008, chap. 15). Expected
inﬂation ceased being a function of actual inﬂation and of above-trend real
growth. For example, recently neither the recovery from the 2001 recession
nor the sustained oil price shock that began in mid-2004 have raised expected
inﬂation signiﬁcantly above 2 percent as measured by the yield difference
between nominal and TIPS (inﬂation-indexed) Treasury securities.
In the 1970s, a few economists (starting originally with Robert Lucas
at Carnegie-Mellon and later at the University of Chicago) argued that the
stagﬂation of the 1970s (the persistence of inﬂation despite assumed excess
unemployment) resulted not from cost-push inﬂation but rather from the way
that monetary policy conditioned inﬂationary expectations.33 That is, it re-
sultedfromalackofcentralbankcredibility. Likethemonetaristsinthe1950s
and 1960s, these economists constituted a miniscule minority of the profes-
sion. However, the success of the Volcker policy of disinﬂation changed
dramatically the intellectual environment. Under Volcker, as a result of a
focus on expected inﬂation, the FOMC simply accepted responsibility for in-
ﬂationwithoutregardtoitspresumedoriginasaggregate-demandorcost-push
(Hetzel2008,chaps. 13and14). Thedesiretoestablishthecredibilityrequired
to control expected inﬂation imposed overall consistency on monetary policy
(Hetzel 2008, chap. 26). The demonstrated ability of monetary policy not
only to control inﬂation but also to do so without periodic recourse to “high”
unemployment gave credence to the idea that the central bank could control
inﬂation through consistent application of policy thought of as a strategy. The
application to monetary policy of the ideas of rational expectations by Lucas
(1972, 1976, and 1980) and of rules by Kydland and Prescott (1977) went
from being an intellectual curiosity to part of mainstream macroeconomics.
5. QUANTITY THEORY VERSUS THE NONMONETARY VIEW
Volcker and Greenspan resurrected Martin’s policy of LAW with credibil-
ity in the form of “inﬂation targeting,” in which the term does not refer to an
33 Lucas (1972) developed the idea of rational expectations to undergird the idea that the
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explicitinﬂationtargetbutrathertopolicyproceduresthatkeeptrendinﬂation
constant at a low level. Which view—the quantity-theory view or the non-
monetary view—provides the better framework for understanding the success
of this policy? That is, how did the Volcker and then the Greenspan FOMCs
discipline the “measured, persistent” changes in the funds rate made in re-
sponse to sustained changes in the degree of resource utilization to maintain
trend inﬂation unchanged in response to aggregate-demand shocks?
The quantity-theory view suggests an interpretation of the Volcker-
Greenspan procedures in terms of what I call a “classical dichotomy.” Credi-
bilitycreatesanexpectationalenvironmentinwhichﬁrmssetpricesconsistent
with unchanged trend inﬂation. Changes in the real funds rate then track the
natural rate and allow the price system to determine real variables.
According to the nonmonetary view, the FOMC manipulates excess un-
employment (an output gap) to manage inﬂation and inﬂation variability ac-
cordingtotradeoffssummarizedbyaPhillipscurve. However, theexperience
with stop-go was not consistent with the existence of the required exploitable
Phillips curve. The problem was that inﬂationary expectations changed in a
way that offset the attempted control of real variables. It follows that if the
central bank cannot manipulate the inﬂation rate to control unemployment
then it also cannot manipulate unemployment to control inﬂation.
Moreover, the nonmonetary view does not accord with the policy proce-
duresoftheVolcker-GreenspanFOMCs. Accordingtothenonmonetaryview,
periodic inﬂation shocks cause inﬂation to overshoot the central bank’s (im-
plicit) inﬂation target. There is a ﬁxed sacriﬁce ratio, which is deﬁned as the
excess-unemploymentcostofeliminatingeachpercentagepointofaninﬂation
overshoot.34 While the central bank can “stretch” the sacriﬁce ratio by elim-
inating inﬂation overshoots over long intervals of time, it must set a path for
excess unemployment to constrain period-by-period funds rate changes such
thatthetotalofexcessunemploymentcumulatestotheproductoftheinﬂation
overshoot and the sacriﬁce ratio. However, nothing in theVolcker-Greenspan
FOMC procedures corresponded to the treatment of excess unemployment as
an intermediate target controlled as an intermediate step in controlling inﬂa-
tion (Hetzel 2008, chap. 21). Changes in the unemployment rate were merely
an indicator of the change in the degree of resource utilization instead of an
independent target.
34 The number of man-years of unemployment in excess of full employment required to lower
the inﬂation rate one percentage point.R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Standard 167
6. CONCLUDING COMMENT
In theVolcker-Greenspan era, the desire of the Fed to reestablish the nominal
expectational stability lost in the stop-go period produced rule-like behavior
intheformofLAWwithcredibility. Thispolicyseparatestheoperationofthe
price system from the control of inﬂation—a classical dichotomy. Monetary
policy relinquished determination of real variables to the price system while
providingastablenominalanchorintheformoflow,stableexpectedinﬂation.
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